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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to bring together the notions of quantum game and game isomorphism. The work is intended
as an attempt to introduce a new criterion for quantum game schemes. The generally accepted requirement forces a
quantum scheme to generate the classical game in a particular case. Now, given a quantum game scheme and two
isomorphic classical games, we additionally require the resulting quantum games to be isomorphic as well. We are
concerned with the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum game scheme and the strong isomorphism between games in
strategic form.
1 Introduction
Sixteen years of research on quantum games have given us many ideas of how quantum games could be described. For
example, we have learned from [1] that players who are allowed to use some specific unitary operators may gain an
advantage over the players who use only classical strategies. The schemes introduced in [2] and [3] give us two different
ways of describing quantum 2 × 2 games. The paper [4], in turn, provides us with a quantum scheme for the Cournot
duopoly game. What connects these protocols is the capability to obtain the classical game. This appears to be a generally
accepted necessary condition imposed on a quantum scheme. One can also find other and more subjective guidelines for
quantum game schemes. Paper [5] shows how to generalize the scheme introduced in [3] by assuming that the new model
should output the classical game (up to the order of players’ strategies) if the initial state is one of the computational
basis states. In addition, the work of Bleiler [6] distinguishes between proper and more strict complete quantization.
Roughly speaking, the first notion concerns quantum schemes where the counterparts of classical pure strategies can be
found in pure quantum strategies. The second one requires the quantum strategy set to include the counterparts of the
mixed classical strategies. With these notions the Marinatto-Weber (MW) [3] scheme turns out to be not even a proper
quantization. The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) [2] scheme, in turn, is a complete quantization, and this is the case
as long as the players’ quantum strategies include the one-parameter unitary operators U(θ, 0, 0) (see formula (11)). In
particular, we can find a lot of papers where the EWL scheme was studied with the two-parameter unitary strategies [7],
[8], [9], [10]. However, as it was noted in [11] the set {U(θ, α, 0)} appears not to reflect any reasonable physical constraint
as this set is not closed under composition. Moreover, [12] showed that different two-parameter strategy spaces in the EWL
scheme imply different sets of Nash equilibria. In this paper we explain why the set of two-parameter unitary operators
may not be reasonable from the game theory viewpoint. Our criterion is formulated in terms of isomorphic games. If
we assume that both classical games are the same with respect to game theoretical tools, we require the corresponding
quantum games to be equivalent in the same way. It is worth noting that quantum game schemes introduced in [2], [3]
and the refined MW scheme defined in [13] preserve the so-called strategic equivalence. We recall what this means.
The following definition can be found in [14]. See the Preliminary section for the definition of strategic form game
(N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and its components.
Definition 1 Two games in strategic form (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and (N, (S i)i∈N , (vi)i∈N) with the same set of players and
the same sets of pure strategies are strategically equivalent if for each player i ∈ N the function vi is a positive affine
transformation of the function ui. In other words, there exist αi > 0 and βi ∈ R such that
vi(s) = αiui(s) + βi, for each s ∈
∏
i∈N
S i. (1)
It is clear that given two strategically equivalent games Γ and Γ′, the player i’s payoff operators Mi and M′i in the quantum
games are connected by equation M′i = αi Mi + βi. Then, by linearity of trace, the quantum payoff functions satisfy (1),
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i.e., tr(ρfin M′i ) = αitr(ρfinMi) + βi. Virtually, strategically equivalent games Γ and Γ′ describe the same game-theoretical
problem. In particular, every equilibrium (pure or mixed) of the game Γ is an equilibrium of the game Γ′.
The strategy equivalence can be extended to take into account different orders of players’ strategies. This type of
equivalence is included in the definition of strong isomorphism. Clearly, if for example, two bimatrix games differ only
in the order of a player’s strategies we still have the games that describe the same problem from the game theoretical
viewpoint. Given a quantum scheme, it appears reasonable to assume that the resulting quantum game will not depend on
the numbering of players’ strategies in the classical game. As a result, if there is a strong isomorphism between games,
we require that the quantum counterparts of these games are also isomorphic.
2 Preliminaries
In order to make our paper self-contained we give the important preliminaries from game theory and quantum game
theory.
2.1 Strong isomorphism
First we recall the definition of strategic form game [14].
Definition 2 A game in strategic form is a triple Γ = (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) in which
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of players.
• S i is the set of strategies of player i, for each player i ∈ N.
• ui : S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n → R is a function associating each vector of strategies s = (si)i∈N with the payoff ui(s) to
player i, for every player i ∈ N.
The notion of strong isomorphism defines classes of games that are the same up to numbering of the players and the order
of players’ strategies. The following definitions are taken from [15] (see also [16], [17] and [18]). The first one defines a
mapping that associates players and their actions in one game with players and their actions in the other game.
Definition 3 Given Γ = (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and Γ′ = (N, (S ′i )i∈N , (u′i)i∈N), a game mapping f from Γ to Γ′ is a tuplef = (η, (ϕi)i∈N) where η is a bijection from N to N and for any i ∈ N, ϕi is a bijection from S i to S η(i).
Example 1 Let us consider two bimatrix games
( l r
t (a00, b00) (a01, b01)
b (a10, b10) (a11, b11)
)
and
( l′ r′
t′ (a′00, b′00) (a′01, b′01)
b′ (a′10, b′10) (a′11, b′11)
)
. (2)
Then, N = {1, 2} and S 1 = {t, b}, S 2 = {l, r}, S ′1 = {t′, b′}, S ′2 = {l′, r′}. As an example of a game mapping letf = (η, ϕ1, ϕ2),
η = (1 → 2, 2 → 1), ϕ1 = (t → l′, b → r′), ϕ2 = (l → b′, r → t′). (3)
Since ϕ1 : S 1 → S ′2 and ϕ2 : S 2 → S ′1, it follows that f maps (s1, s2) ∈ S 1 × S 2 to (ϕ2(s2), ϕ1(s1)). From (3) we conclude
that
f = ((t, l) → (b′, l′), (t, r) → (t′, l′), (b, l) → (b′, r′), (b, r) → (t′, r′)). (4)
In general case, mapping f from (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) to (N, (S ′i )i∈N , (u′i)i∈N) identifies player i ∈ N with player η(i) and
maps S i to S η(i). This means that strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n is mapped into profile (s′1, . . . , s′n) that
satisfies equation s′
η(i) = ϕi(si) for i ∈ N.
The notion of game mapping is a basis for definition of game isomorphism. Depending on how rich structure of the
game is to be preserved we can distinguish various types of game isomorphism. One that preserves the players’ payoff
functions is called the strong isomorphism. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 4 Given two strategic games Γ = (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and Γ′ = (N, (S ′i )i∈N , (u′i)i∈N), a game mapping f =
(η, (ϕi)i∈N) is called a strong isomorphism if relation ui(s) = u′η(i)( f (s)) holds for each i ∈ N and each strategy profile
s ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n.
From the above definition it may be concluded that if there is a strong isomorphism between games Γ and Γ′, they may
differ merely by the numbering of players and the order of their strategies.
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Example 2 Let f be a game mapping defined in Example 1. By definition, f becomes the strong isomorphism if condition
ui(s) = u′η(i)( f (s)) is imposed on the payoffs in (2). This gives
a00 = b′10, a01 = b
′
00, a10 = b
′
11, a11 = b
′
01,
b00 = a′10, b01 = a′00, b10 = a′11, b11 = a′01,
(5)
where, for instance, a01 = b′00 follows from equation u1((t, r)) = u′2((t′, l′)). Substituting (5) into (2) we conclude that
games
( l r
t (a00, b00) (a01, b01)
b (a10, b10) (a11, b11)
)
and
( l′ r′
t′ (b01, a01) (b11, a11)
b′ (b00, a00) (b10, a10)
)
. (6)
are isomorphic. In this case, the games differ by the numbering of players and the order of strategies of player 2. Indeed,
in the second game of (6) player 1 and 2 choose now between columns and rows, respectively. Moreover, player 1’s first
(second) strategy still guarantees the payoff a00 or a01 (a10 or a11) whereas player 2’s strategies are interchanged: the first
one implies now the payoff b01 or b11.
Relabeling players or their strategies does not affect a game with regard to Nash equilibria. If f is a strong isomorphism
between games Γ and Γ′, one may expect that the Nash equilibria in Γ map to ones in Γ′ under f . We will prove the
following lemma as it is needed throughout the paper.
Lemma 1 Let f be a strong isomorphism between games Γ and Γ′. Strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗n) ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n is a
Nash equilibrium in game Γ if and only if f (s∗) ∈ S ′1 × · · · × S ′n is a Nash equilibrium in Γ′.
Proof The proof is based on the following observation. Since f ((s1, . . . , sn)) = (s′1, . . . , s′n) where s′η(i) = ϕi(si), it follows
that f ((si, s−i)) may be written as
(
s′
η(i), s
′
−η(i)
)
. As f is an isomorphism, we have ui(s) = u′η(i)( f (s)) for each strategy profile
s. Thus
ui(s∗) = u′η(i)
(
s∗
′
1 , . . . , s
∗′
n
)
(7)
and
ui
(
si, s
∗
−i
)
= u′η(i)
( f (si, s∗−i)) = u′η(i) (s′η(i), s∗′−η(i)) . (8)
This allows us to conclude that the inequality
ui(s∗) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) (9)
holds for each i ∈ N and each strategy si ∈ S i if and only if
u′η(i)
(
s∗
′
1 , . . . , s
∗′
n
)
≥ u′η(i)
(
s′pi(i), s
∗′
−η(i)
)
(10)
for each η(i) ∈ N and each strategy s′i ∈ S ′i . This finishes the proof. 
2.2 Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme
Let us consider a strategic game Γ = (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) with S i =
{
si0, s
i
1
}
for each i ∈ N. The generalized Eisert-Wilkens-
Lewenstein approach to game Γ is defined by triple ΓEWL = (N, (Di)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N), where
• Di is a set of unitary operators from SU(2). The commonly used parametrization for U ∈ SU(2) is given by
U(θ, α, β) =
(
eiα cos θ2 ie
iβ sin θ2
ie−iβ sin θ2 e
−iα cos θ2
)
, θ ∈ [0, pi], α, β ∈ [0, 2pi). (11)
Then Di is assumed to include set {U(θ, 0, 0) : θ ∈ [0, pi]}. Elements Ui ∈ Di play the role of player i’s strategies.
The players, by choosing Ui ∈ Di, determine the final state |Ψ〉 according to the following formula:
|Ψ〉 = J†

n⊗
i=1
Ui(θi, αi, βi)
 J|0〉⊗n where J = 1√2
(
1
⊗n + iσ⊗nx
)
(12)
(1 is the identity matrix of size 2 and σx is the Pauli matrix X).
• Mi is an observable defined by the formula
Mi =
∑
j1,..., jn∈{0,1}
aij1... jn | j1 . . . jn〉〈 j1 . . . jn|. (13)
The numbers aij1... jn are the player i’s payoffs in Γ such that a
i
j1... jn = ui
(
sij1 , . . . , s
i
jn
)
. The player i’s payoff ui in ΓEWL
is defined as the average value of measurement Mi, i.e.,
ui

n⊗
i=1
Ui(θi, αi, βi)
 ≔ 〈Ψ|Mi|Ψ〉. (14)
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3 Strong isomorphism in Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum games
Having specified the notion of strong isomorphism and the generalized Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme we will now
check if the isomorphism between the classically played games makes the corresponding quantum games isomorphic. We
first examine the case when the players’ unitary strategies depend on two parameters. The quantum game ΓEWL with
Di = {Ui(θi, αi, 0) : θi ∈ [0, pi], αi ∈ [0, 2pi)} (15)
is particularly interested. That setting was used to introduce the EWL scheme [2] and has been widely studied in recent
years (see, for example, [7], [8], [9], [10]). We begin with an example of isomorphic games that describe the Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
Example 3 The generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma game and one of its isomorphic counterparts may be given by the fol-
lowing bimatrices:
Γ :
( l r
t (R,R) (S , T )
b (T, S ) (P, P)
)
and Γ′ :
( l′ r′
t′ (S , T ) (R,R)
b′ (P, P) (T, S )
)
, (16)
where T > R > P > S . Note that the games are the same up to the order of player 2’ strategies. Let us now examine the
EWL approach to Γ and Γ′ defined by triples
ΓEWL =
({1, 2}, ({Ui(θi, αi, 0} : )i∈{1,2}, (Mi)i∈{1,2}) ,
Γ′EWL =
({1, 2}, ({U ′i (θ′i , α′i , 0})i∈{1,2}, (M′i )i∈{1,2}) , (17)
where
(M1, M2) = (R,R)|00〉〈00|+ (S , T )|01〉〈01|+ (T, S )|10〉〈10|+ (P, P)|11〉〈11|,
(M′1, M′2) = (S , T )|00〉〈00|+ (R,R)|01〉〈01|+ (P, P)|10〉〈10|+ (T, S )|11〉〈11|.
(18)
We first compare the sets of Nash equilibria in ΓEWL and Γ′EWL to check if the games may be isomorphic. We recall from
[2] that there is the unique Nash equilibrium U1(0, pi/2, 0)⊗U2(0, pi/2, 0) in ΓEWL that determines the payoff profile (R,R).
When it comes to Γ′EWL , we set n = 2 in (12) and replace (13) by M′1 and M′2 from (18). Then we can rewrite (14) as
(u′1, u′2)
(
U1(θ′1, α′1, 0) ⊗ U2(θ′2, α′2, 0)
)
= (S , T )
(
cos (α′1 + α′2) cos
θ′1
2
cos
θ′2
2
)2
+ (R,R)
(
cosα′1 cos
θ′1
2
sin
θ′2
2
+ sinα′2 sin
θ′1
2
cos
θ′2
2
)2
+ (P, P)
(
sinα′1 cos
θ′1
2
sin
θ′2
2
+ cosα′2 sin
θ′1
2
cos
θ′2
2
)2
+ (T, S )
(
sin(α′1 + α′2) cos
θ′1
2
cos
θ′2
2
− sin θ
′
1
2
sin
θ′2
2
)2
. (19)
Let U ′2(θ′2, α′2, 0) be an arbitrary but fixed strategy of player 2. Then it follows from (19) that strategy U ′1(θ′1, α′1, 0) specified
by equation
U ′1(θ′1, α′1, 0) =

U ′1(θ′2, 3pi/2 − α′2, 0) if α′2 ∈ [0, 3pi/2],
U ′1(θ′2, 7pi/2 − α′2, 0) if α′2 ∈ (3pi/2, 2pi),
(20)
is player 1’s best reply to U ′2(θ′2, α′2, 0) as it yields player 1 the payoff T . Hence, a possible Nash equilibrium would
generate the maximal payoff for player 1. On the other hand, given a fixed player 1’s strategy U ′1(θ′1, α′1, 0), player 2 can
obtain a payoff that is strictly higher than S by choosing, for example, U2(θ′2, α′2, 0) with θ′2 = 0, α′2 = 2pi−α′1. This means
that the player 1 would obtain strictly less than T . Hence, there is no pure Nash equilibrium in the game determined by
Γ′EWL . As a result, we can conclude by Lemma 1 that games (17) are not strongly isomorphic.
The example given above shows that the EWL approach with the two-parameter unitary strategies may output different
Nash equilibria depending on the order of players’ strategies in the classical game. This appears to be a strange feature
since games (16) represent the same decision problem from a game-theoretical point of view.
One way to make games (17) isomorphic is to replace player i’s strategy set (15) with the alternative two-parameter
strategy space
Fi = {Ui(θi, 0, βi) : θi ∈ [0, pi], βi ∈ [0, 2pi)} (21)
every time player i’s strategies are switched in the classical game. In the case of games (17) this means that quantum
games
ΓEWL =
({1, 2}, (D1, D2), (Mi)i∈{1,2}) , Γ′EWL = ({1, 2}, (D′1, F′2), (M′i )i∈{1,2}) (22)
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are isomorphic. Indeed, define a game map ˜f = (η, ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) with η(i) = i for i = 1, 2 and bijections ϕ˜1 : D1 → D′1 and
ϕ˜2 : D2 → F′2 satisfying
ϕ˜1 (U1(θ1, α1, 0)) = U ′1(θ1, α1, 0), ϕ˜2 (U2(θ1, α1, 0)) = U ′2(pi − θ2, 0, pi − α2). (23)
The map ϕ˜2 should actually distinguish cases α2 ∈ [0, pi) and α2 ∈ [pi, 2pi) to be a well-defined bijection as it was done in
equation (20). To simplify the proof we stick to the form (23) throughout the paper bearing in mind that for pi−α2 < [0, 2pi)
we can always find the equivalent angle 3pi − α2 ∈ [0, 2pi). We have to show for games (22) that
ui(U1 ⊗ U2) = 〈Ψ|Mi|Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ′|M′i |Ψ′〉 = u′i( ˜f (U1 ⊗ U2)) (24)
for i = 1, 2, where |Ψ〉 = J†(U1 ⊗ U2)J|00〉 and |Ψ′〉 = J†( ˜f (U1 ⊗ U2))J|00〉. First, note that U ′2(pi − θ2, 0, pi − α2) =
iσxU ′2(θ2, α2, 0). Hence, we obtain
|Ψ′〉 = J† ˜f (U1(θ1, α1, 0) ⊗ U2(θ2, α2, 0))J|00〉
= J†(U ′1(θ1, α1, 0) ⊗ U2(pi − θ2, 0, pi − α2))J|00〉
= (1 ⊗ (−iσx))J†(U ′1(θ1, α1, 0) ⊗ U ′2(θ2, α2, 0))J|00〉
= (1 ⊗ (−iσx))|Ψ〉. (25)
Application of (25) finally yields
〈Ψ′|M′i |Ψ′〉 = 〈Ψ|(1 ⊗ iσx)M′i (1 ⊗ (−iσx))|Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ|M1|Ψ〉. (26)
In similar way we can prove a more general fact. Namely, if F2 is player 2’s strategy set in one of games (17) and D2
is in the the other one then games (17) become strongly isomorphic. This observation suggests that the EWL scheme is
robust with respect to changing the order of players’ strategies in the classical game if the players can use strategies from
Di ∪ Fi, or equivalently from the set SU(2). Before stating the general result we study a specific example.
Example 4 Let us consider the following three-person games:
v
( l r
t (a000, b000, c000) (a010, b010, c010)
b (a100, b100, c100) (a110, b110, c110)
)
w
( l r
t (a001, b001, c001) (a011, b011, c011)
b (a101, b101, c101) (a111, b111, c111)
)
and
v′
( l′ r′
t′ (a000, b000, c000) (a010, b010, c010)
b′ (a100, b100, c100) (a110, b110, c110)
)
w′
( l′ r′
t′ (a001, b001, c001) (a011, b011, c011)
b′ (a101, b101, c101) (a111, b111, c111)
)
.
The games are (strongly) isomorphic via game mapping f = (η, ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) such that
η = (1 → 2, 2 → 3, 3 → 1),
ϕ1 = (t → l′, b → r′), ϕ2 = (l → w′, r → v′), ϕ3 = (v → b′,w → t′).
(27)
We see from (27) that the isomorphism maps strategy profiles as follows:
f (t, l, v) = (b′, l′,w′), f (t, r, v) = (b′, l′, v′), f (b, l, v) = (b′, r′,w′),
f (b, r, v) = (b′, r′, v′), f (t, l,w) = (t′, l′,w′), f (t, r,w) = (t′, l′, v′)
f (b, l,w) = (t′, r′,w′), f (b, r,w) = (t′, r′, v′).
(28)
Let us now define the EWL quantum extensions ΓEWL and Γ′EWL for the three-player game where we identify the
players’ first and second strategies with values 0 and 1, respectively. That is,
ΓEWL = (N, (Di)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N) and Γ′EWL = (N, (D′i)i∈N , (M′i )i∈N) (29)
where N = {1, 2, 3}, Di = D′i = SU(2) for each i ∈ N,
(M1, M2, M3) =
∑
j1, j2, j3=0,1
(a j1 j2 j3 , b j1 j2 j3 , c j1 j2 j3 )P j1 j2 j3 , (30)
(M′1, M′2, M′3) =
∑
j1, j2, j3=0,1
(c j1 j2 j3 , a j1 j2 j3 , b j1 j2 j3 )P f ( j1 j2 j3), (31)
5
where P j1 j2 j3 = | j1 j2 j3〉〈 j1 j2 j3|. Given f = (η, (ϕi)i∈N) let us define a mapping ˜f = (η, (ϕ˜i)i∈N) such that ϕ˜i : Di → D′η(i)
for i ∈ N and
ϕ˜1(U1(θ1, α1, β1)) = U ′2(θ1, α1, β1),
ϕ˜2(U2(θ2, α2, β2)) = U ′3(pi − θ2, 2pi − β2, pi − α2),
ϕ˜3(U3(θ3, α3, β3)) = U ′1(pi − θ3, 2pi − β3, pi − α3).
(32)
Then, ˜f induces a bijection from D1 ⊗ D2 ⊗ D3 to D′1 ⊗ D′2 ⊗ D′3 such that
˜f (U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3) = (ϕ˜3(U3(θ3, α3, β3)), ϕ˜1(U1(θ1, α1, β1)) ⊗ ϕ˜2(U2(θ2, α2, β2)))
= U ′1(pi − θ3, 2pi − β3, pi − α3) ⊗ U ′2(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U ′3(pi − θ2, 2pi − β2, pi − α2).
According to the EWL scheme, the payoff functions for ΓEWL and Γ′EWL are as follows:
ui(U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3) = 〈Ψ|Mi|Ψ〉, where |Ψ〉 = J†(U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3)J|000〉
u′i(U ′1 ⊗ U ′2 ⊗ U ′3) = 〈Ψ′|M′i |Ψ′〉, where |Ψ′〉 = J†(U ′1 ⊗ U ′2 ⊗ U ′3)J|000〉
(33)
for i ∈ N. In order to prove that ΓEWL and Γ′EWL are isomorphic we have to check if
ui(U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3) = u′η(i)( ˜f (U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3)) for i ∈ N. (34)
Without loss of generality we can assume that i = 1. Let us first evaluate state |Ψ′〉,
|Ψ′〉 = J†
(
U ′1(pi − θ3, 2pi − β3, pi − α3) ⊗ U ′2(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U ′3(pi − θ2, 2pi − β2, pi − α2)
)
J|000〉. (35)
Note that
U ′1(pi − θ3, 2pi − β3, pi − α3) ⊗ U ′2(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U ′3(pi − θ2, 2pi − β2, pi − α2)
= (−σx ⊗ 1 ⊗ σx)(U ′1(θ3, α3, β3) ⊗ U ′2(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U ′3(θ2, β2, α2)) (36)
and
U ′1(θ3, α3, β3) ⊗ U ′2(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U ′3(θ2, α2, β2)
= S η
(
U ′2(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U ′3(θ2, α2, β2) ⊗ U ′1(θ3, α3, β3)
)
S †η, (37)
where S η is a permutation matrix that changes the order of qubits according to η,
S η = |000〉〈000|+ |001〉〈010|+ |010〉〈100|+ |011〉〈110|
+ |100〉〈001|+ |101〉〈011|+ |110〉〈101|+ |111〉〈111|. (38)
Using (36), (37), the fact that [J†,−σx ⊗ 1 ⊗ σx] = [J†, S η] = [J, S η] = 0 and S †η |000〉 = |000〉 we may write |Ψ′〉 as
follows:
|Ψ′〉 = − (σx ⊗ 1 ⊗ σx) S ηJ†
(
U ′2(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U ′3(θ2, α2, β2) ⊗ U ′1(θ3, α3, β3)
)
J|000〉
= − (σx ⊗ 1 ⊗ σx) S η|Ψ〉 (39)
Note that 〈 j1 j2 j3|S η =
(
S †η | j1 j2 j3〉
)†
. This means that S η is the inverse operation when acting on dual vectors. This
observation together with the fact that f changes the strategy order for player 1 and 3 lead us to conclusion that operator
±(σx ⊗ 1 ⊗ σx)S η can be viewed as f −1 in the sense of the following equality:
|〈 j1 j2 j3|(−σx ⊗ 1 ⊗ σx)S η| = |〈 f −1( j1 j2 j3)|. (40)
Let us now consider term 〈Ψ′|P f ( j1 j2 j3)|Ψ′〉 for |Ψ′〉 given by (35). From (39) and (40) it follows that
〈Ψ′|P f ( j1 j2 j3)|Ψ′〉 = |〈 f ( j1 j2 j3)|Ψ′〉|2 = |〈 f ( j1 j2 j3)|(σx ⊗ 1 ⊗ σx)S η|Ψ〉|2
= |〈 j1 j2 j3|Ψ〉|2 = 〈Ψ|P j1 j2 j3 |Ψ〉. (41)
Hence,
uη(1)( ˜f (U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3)) = 〈Ψ′|M′η(1)|Ψ′〉 = 〈Ψ|M1|Ψ〉 = u1(U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3). (42)
Similar reasoning applies to the case i = 2, 3. We have thus proved that games given by (29) are isomorphic.
The same conclusion can be drawn for games with arbitrary but finite number N of players.
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Proposition 1 Let Γ = (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and Γ′ = (N, (S ′i )i∈N , (u′i)i∈N) be strongly isomorphic strategic form games with
|S i| = |S ′i | = 2 and let ΓEWL = (N, (Di)i∈N , (Mi)i∈N) and Γ′EWL = (N, (D′i )i∈N , (M′i )i∈N) with Di = D′i = SU(2) be the
corresponding quantum games. Then ΓEWL and Γ′EWL are strongly isomorphic.
Proof The proof follows by the same method as in Example 4. Let f = (η, (ϕi)i∈N) be a strong isomorphism between
Γ and Γ′. Depending on ϕi : S i → S ′η(i) such that ϕi(sik) = sη(i)l for Ai = {si0, si1} and Aη(i) = {sη(i)0 , sη(i)1 } we construct
˜f = (η, (ϕ˜i)i∈N) where
ϕ˜i(Ui(θi, αi, βi)) =

U ′
η(i)(θi, αi, βi) if ϕi
(
sik
)
= s
η(i)
k
U ′
η(i)(pi − θi, 2pi − βi, pi − αi) if ϕi
(
sik
)
= s
η(i)
k⊕21.
(43)
Then ˜f
(⊗N
i=1 Ui
)
=
⊗N
i=1 U
′
i , where U
′
η(i) = ϕ˜i(Ui) for i = 1, . . .N. Since η is a permutation and U(pi− θ, 2pi− β, pi−α) =
−iσxU(θ, α, β), we can write relation (43) as
ϕ˜η−1(i)(Uη−1(i)(θη−1(i), αη−1(i), βη−1(i))) =

U ′i (θη−1(i), αη−1(i), βη−1(i)) if ϕi
(
sik
)
= s
η(i)
k
−iσxU ′i (θη−1(i), αη−1(i), βη−1(i)) if ϕi
(
sik
)
= s
η(i)
k⊕21.
(44)
As a result, ˜f maps ⊗Ni=1 Uη−1(i) onto ⊗Ni=1 U ′i as follows:
˜f

N⊗
i=1
Ui
 =
N⊗
i=1
Vi
N⊗
i=1
U ′i (θη−1(i), αη−1(i), βη−1(i)), Vi =

1 if ϕi
(
sik
)
= s
η(i)
k
−iσx if ϕi
(
sik
)
= s
η(i)
k⊕21.
(45)
Let us now consider a permutation matrix S η ∈ M2N that rearranges the order of basis states {| ji〉} ∈ {|0〉, |1〉} in the tensor
product | j1〉| j2〉 . . . | jN〉. Since S η permutes the elements in a similar way as ˜f , it is not difficult to see that
S η
N⊗
i=1
Ui(θi, αi, βi)S Tη =
N⊗
i=1
Ui(θη−1(i), αη−1(i), βη−1(i)) (46)
It is also clear that σ⊗Nx commutes with
⊗N
i=1 Vi and S η and so does J = (1⊗N + iσ⊗Nx )/
√
2. Thus the final state |Ψ′〉 =
J† ˜f
(⊗N
i=1 Ui(θi, αi, βi)
)
J|0〉⊗N may be written as
|Ψ′〉 =
N⊗
i=1
ViS ηJ†

N⊗
i=1
Ui(θi, αi, βi)
 J|0〉⊗N =
N⊗
i=1
ViS η|Ψ〉. (47)
Analysis similar to that in equations (40)-(42) shows that
uη(i)
 ˜f

N⊗
i=1
Ui

 = ui

N⊗
i=1
Ui
 , (48)
which is the desired conclusion. 
As the following example shows, the converse is not true in general.
Example 5 Let us consider two 2 × 2 bimatrix games that differ only in the order of payoff profiles in the anti-diagonal,
i.e.,
Γ :
( l r
t (a00, b00) (a01, b01)
b (a10, b10) (a11, b11)
)
and Γ′ :
( l′ r′
t′ (a00, b00) (a10, b10)
b′ (a01, b01) (a11, b11)
)
. (49)
The EWL quantum counterpartsΓEWL and Γ′EWL for these games are specified by triples (29), where in this case N = {1, 2},
Di = D′i = SU(2) and the measurement operators take the form
(M1, M2) =
∑
j1, j2=0,1
(a j1 j2 , b j1 j2 )P j1 j2 , (M′1, M′2) =
∑
j1, j2=0,1
(a j1 j2 , b j1 j2 )P j2 j1 , (50)
where P j1 j2 = | j1 j2〉〈 j1 j2|. Let us set a mapping ˜f = (η, (ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2)) with η(i) = i and ϕ˜i(Ui(θi, αi, βi) = U ′i (pi − θi, pi/4 −
βi, pi/4 − αi)) for i = 1, 2. An easy computation shows that
|Ψ′〉 = J† ˜f (U1 ⊗ U2)J|00〉
= J†
(
U1
(
pi − θ1,
pi
4
− β1,
pi
4
− α1
)
⊗ U2
(
pi − θ2,
pi
4
− β2,
pi
4
− α2
))
J|00〉
= S FJ†(U1(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U2(θ2, α2, β2))J|00〉 = S F |Ψ〉, (51)
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where S has the outer product representation S = |00〉〈00| + |01〉〈10| + |10〉〈01| + |11〉〈11| and F = |00〉〈00| + |01〉〈10| +
|10〉〈01| − |11〉〈11|. Application of equation (51) gives
u′i
(
˜f (U1 ⊗ U2)
)
= 〈Ψ′|M′i |Ψ′〉 = 〈Ψ|FS M′i S F |Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ|Mi|Ψ〉 = ui(U1 ⊗ U2). (52)
As a result, games produced by ΓEWL and Γ′EWL are strongly isomorphic. This fact, however, is not sufficient to guarantee
the isomorphism between Γ and Γ′. Indeed, one can check that there is no f = (η, (ϕ1, ϕ2)) to satisfy ui(s) = u′η(i)( f (s))
for each s ∈ {t, b} × {l, r} and i = 1, 2. Alternatively, given specific payoff profiles (a00, b00) = (4, 4), (a01, b01) =
(1, 3), (a10, b10) = (3, 1), (a11, b11) = (2, 2), we can find three Nash equilibria in the game Γ and just one in the game
Γ′. Hence, by Lemma 1 games (49) are not isomorphic.
4 Conclusions
The theory of quantum games has no rigorous mathematical structure. There are no formal axioms, definitions that would
give clear directions of how a quantum game ought to look like. In fact, only one condition is taken into consideration. It
says that a quantum game ought to include the classical way of playing the game. As a result, this allows us to define a
quantum game scheme in many different ways. The scheme we have studied in the paper is definitely ingenious. It has
made a significant contribution to quantum game theory. However, it leaves the freedom of choice of the players’ strategy
sets. Our criterion for quantum strategic game schemes requires the quantum model to preserve strong isomorphism.
This specifies the strategy sets to be SU(2). We have shown that a proper subset of SU(2) in the EWL scheme may
imply different quantum counterparts of the same game-theoretical problem. In that case, the resulting quantum game
(in particular, its Nash equilibria) depends on the order of players’ strategies in the input bimatrix game. Hence, given a
classical game, for example the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we cannot say anything about the properties of the EWL approach
with the two-parameter unitary strategies until we specify an explicit bimatrix for that game. This is not the case in the
EWL scheme with SU(2) where, given a classical bimatrix game or its isomorphic counterpart, we always obtain the same
from the game-theoretical point of view quantum game.
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